The first research group in Marseille was set up in 1986 by Jacques Ginestié. Of course, settings, proximity and conviviality or togetherness heavily influenced the group's early work. On the local scene, a group of researchers made up primarily of René Amigues, Yves Chevallard, Jean-Jacques Dupin and Samuel Joshua, laid the foundations for what would later become the Marseille approach to a domain defining itself as didactic research into scientific disciplines. This change, and its very integration, not corresponding to the English term "didactic", took on a whole new meaning in France, defining an area of research which was highly original. On the one hand, this research is concerned with the process of transforming knowledge from intellectual expertise, into a form of scholarity; something which was heralded at the time as a process of scholarly flexibility, allowing people to distinguish between knowledge and taught expertise. What also develops is an interest in the school environment as a specific place where the teacher organises his knowledge and brings it to life, in such a way as to render it useful to students.
The first point to be highlighted is that of references, starting points, and organisation of teaching; In terms of progression, contextualisation, level of demand, what the students have to learn, and also the way in which they are taught. This point is hugely important, and is heavily emphasised in France. This curricular approach can be viewed and perceived in different ways. Other research teams in France would go on to develop this curricular basis and framework. (Michel towards sociological references to deal with targets, ways of transmitting knowledge, impact and effectiveness of the taught curriculum in the school setup. The approach developed by the different groups, which for the most part concerns diverse areas of research, is radically different. This approach is based on an anthropological perspective, in which knowledge allows the individual to act in a context which is socially, culturally or ideologically identified. From this perspective, we can cite knowledge which is of a social grounding. In other words, knowledge provided culturally. Such an approach allows us to place knowledge in the social organisation that brings it to life, that is to say, which conceives, develops and enriches it; the school in the broader sense of the word being a specific social organisation. School brings to life specific knowledge which only exists because of the necessity to pass it on to students, and because society is group -teachers.
In this way, scholarly knowledge is a specific social construction with specific circumstances, and the rapport with references is one based not on homothecy or even isomorphism, but instead on pertinence or usefulness. How is learning certain information going to help a student develop in social spheres; i.e. outside of school? This question of usefulness allows one to look at the question of references in terms other than authenticity, realism, or precise scholarly situations with which students are faced. What is at stake through effectiveness of teaching is, of course, effectiveness measured in terms of learning. In other words, the potential capacity for student development as they advance in their studies. The anthropological approach, bearing in mind genesis, historical and socio-cultural founding of organised in such a way that this knowledge is passed on by a particular social Develay, Joel Lebeaume, Jean-Louis Martinand for example.) This leans heavily scholarly expertise, places importance on the school environment and more precisely, on the study of didactic situations in which such knowledge is used. Several studies have highlighted the ineffectiveness of teaching based solely on learning by heart. While the English call this didactics, we in France refer to a dogmatic approach to teaching. This means that educational research such as we've developed it in different groups in Marseilles, with regard to Maths, Earth Sciences and Technology relies heavily on this idea of appreciating the effectiveness of these situations through the medium of student learning. The choice which brought this research to the fore and is a consequence of the common interests of the people involved, is essentially based on appreciating this effectiveness from the point of view of the forming of knowledge by the individual. Of course, such a choice is one made in a specific situation, in a local context, the coming together of researchers who would go on to form the GESTEPRO team.
In 1986, at a conference in Marseilles on 'Teaching and Technology', a number of the current researchers (namely Lebehar, Andreucci, Ginestié) formed the basis for such research, without knowing exactly what form it would eventually take. The evolution at the end of the eighties, employing teachers with a degree which would lead to the creation of the IUFM and in turn accelerate the development of a research structure on technological education, brought about uniformity in teacher training. Given that local teacher training had to comply with national criteria, it was necessary to put the framework in place, to allow training to evolve. Such a framework included research into education in general, or as far as we are concerned, technological education. This was vital for creating a fundamental area of research finalised by the needs of training and education. The IUFM in Aix-Marseilles relied on a research structure to help the emergence and institutionalisation of research teams. Help with participating in conferences, colloquiums and seminars allowed people involved locally to take part in national and also international debates. In that sense, the conferences organised by the PATT foundation, WOCATE, or by CRIPT in Birmingham, were as much to do with the internationalisation of publications as with gaining an insight into the preoccupations researchers from other countries were faced with. We should note during these initial difficulties, the organisation in 1999 of an international meeting about the project for technological education, of which the stages were published by the Aix-Marseilles IUFM review, Skholê. This meeting was particularly beneficial, not least as a means of realising that the term 'didactique' didn't have the same meaning in French and English.
The programme Université 2000 reinforced the stance taken by universities for training technology teachers, with the construction of the inter-university mechanics centre in Marseilles, more commonly known as Uniméca. By grouping together in the same building the training schemes for engineers, researchers and teachers of mechanics, industrial project management, thermal and electrical engineering, such proximity gave rise to something original in France -the integration of teacher training in the same fields on both introductory and continuous levels. The dynamic created generated numerous national, European and international research programmes. Alongside fundamental and applied research in key domains, the technological education research team went on to reinforce the link between research and teacher training.
The structuring of research based on recognised international procedures lends itself to the forming of the relevant teams, identified by the areas in which they specialise. The small group was strengthened by the contribution of the INRP, who appointed three engineers. The merging of the scientific and technological education groups, run by Jean-Jacques Dupin and Jacques Ginestié respectively, allowed for the creation of a laboratory blessed with expertise in a wide range of disciplines, and a clearly defined research plan. Today the team comprises three university teachers, three lecturers, three engineers and about twenty doctoral students. Four researchers are associated with the laboratory to help the team in their work. This volume is a rundown of the work undertaken by the Technological Education team. Like photography, this publication only shows some characteristics of the work. However, it contains all the elements of this conception or genesis that we can relate to in terms of problems encountered and solved, material allowing us to analyse them, methodologies put into place. Besides the studies presented in a somewhat scientific way, credit for this work must also go to Marc de Vries, whose unwavering consistency and friendship have allowed this book to be published. He pleaded on several occasions for the originality of the work we carried out to be broadcast to an audience far beyond the Mediterranean. I thank the team members and Marc de Vries for the pleasure I take from working with them, some of whom I have now been working with for several years. . Those countries have their own series of conferences (for instance, the "AEET or ARDIST conferences" or the "Rencontres de Chamonix", of which proceedings are available). The two groups, the Anglo-Saxon and the Francophone, do not get to know each others' work and lots of opportunities for fruitful exchange of ideas are missed. This book tries to contribute to bridging the gap by presenting outcomes of French research in the English language. For a good understanding of these outcomes it is necessary to have some background knowledge. Misunderstandings easily arise when the terminology in the chapters of this book is not well understood. This chapter describes some of the differences between the French tradition in educational research for technology education and the Anglo-Saxon traditions.
BRINGING TOGETHER PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

INTRODUCTION
THE TERM 'DIDACTIQUE'
The first possible source of misunderstandings is the use of the word 'didactique', for which the English word 'didactics' seems to be the immediate translation. But this is misleading. The meaning of the word 'didactique' is quite different from that of the word 'didactics'. The French word 'didactique' has equivalents in at least two other European languages: 'Didaktik' in German and 'didactiek' in Dutch. In those languages the word has the same broad meaning as in French. The word indicates a whole knowledge domain. It is a discipline rather than a set of rules for how to teach, as is the usual meaning in English. 'Didactique' comprises both educational research as well as the reflections on how to use those to improve teaching and learning. In general 'didactique ' (or 'Didaktik' and 'didaktiek') 3. how can educational contexts and strategies be realized that ensure that the desired learning (question 1) takes place, given the characteristics of those that teach and those that learn (question 2)? For technology education that means, for instance, the issue of how to set up design-and-make projects and how to assess those.
It is clear that this meaning of 'didactique' in French differs much from the narrow meaning of 'didactics' in English. It comes closer to the term 'Pedagogical Content Knowledge' (PCK) that we find in use nowadays in the UK. This should be kept in mind when one comes across this word in the following chapters.
'SCHOOLS' OF TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION RESEARCH IN FRANCE
The current situation of 'didactique' research in France is that there are two large groups and a couple of smaller groups. The debates between the two large groups to a large extent determine the overall debates in the country. One group is the GESTEPRO group, of which the work is presented in this book. The other group is located in Cachan, and is led by Jean-Louis Martinand. This group, too, has published some work in English (mainly written by Jean-Louis Martinand himself and by Joel Lebeaume). This group had most influence on determining the French national curriculum for technology education. This is probably related to the impression we get that the content of the curriculum is the main focus of this group. We will find here, for instance, less interest in learning psychology than in the GESTEPRO group. Another bias in the Cachan group is an orientation on science and science education.
CONCEPTUALIZATION AS A FOCUS
One of the characteristics of the French tradition in technology education research is that it has a peculiar focus that we do not find much elsewhere. This is also quite evident in the chapters that follow this introduction. In the French research there is often an explicit attention for a proper conceptualization of the subject content. A lot of research in the GESTEPRO group aims at gaining insight into how mental images are formed that match with what technology is really like. This approach means a bringing together of philosophy and (cognitive) psychology. The interest in technology can be seen from the content of some seminars that have been held for the group, one of which became the basis for a book that introduced the philosophy of technology for non-philosophers (De Vries, 2005i) and another one was about the relations between science and technology in the history of an industrial research laboratory (De Vries, 2005ii) . During these seminars it was evident that there was quite some knowledge of philosophy in the group. The Anglo-Saxon literature may have been unknown for the GESTEPRO members, but they were certainly aware of the work of some French philosophers, among whom Gilbert Simondon, one the few French philosophers who specialized in the philosophy of technology. For a sound development of technology education such an orientation on the philosophy and history of technology are indispensable. The philosophy of technology has the question of what technology really is as its main focus. Even though this is still a fairly young discipline, lots of valuable insights have already been gained (see, for instance, the survey made by Carl Mitcham in his book Thinking Through Technology, 1994). In the French tradition it is seen as important that what is taught in schools in some way reflects technology as it is practiced professionally. For this the term 'reference' is often used. This term expresses that the real world should be the point of reference, a hallmark of truth. In the French curriculum for some time it was primarily the industrial practice that served as the main reference. This was mirrored in classroom projects in which artefacts were deigned and made that in principle could be mass-produced.
THE ISSUE OF TRANSFORMATION
Characteristic for the French technology education research is also the awareness that the insights about what technology is in the real world needs to go through a transformation in order to become teachable and learnable. This transformation is similar to the transformation that concepts from science need to go through in order to become usable for engineers (as described by Vincenti in his book What Engineers Know and How They Know It). We also find the terms 'transmission' and 'transposition' used in French for this. Education can not present reality in its full complexity. Simplification through transformation is necessary, but only to such an extent that reality is done justice to. In other words: the content of the real world has to be appropriated for being implemented in educational settings. For that reason the term 'appropriation' in French is also frequently found in this context. This challenge gets ample attention in the French approach, not only in Marseille, but also in Cachan. In fact, this is seen as one of the main challenges of 'didactique'. Cognitive psychology can play an important role in the identification of what is teachable and learnable. Therefore this transformation or transmission has two poles: insights that are at least partially derived from the philosophy of technology on the one hand and on the other hand psychological insights of what can be taught and learnt. In a way one could characterize the French technology education research tradition, as far as the GESTEPRO approach is concerned, as a bringing together of philosophy and psychology.
TASKS AND ACTIVITIES
A second transformation that has to take place in technology education is that from tasks to activities. Here cognitive psychology again plays an important role. What activities to be executed by the pupils will make them reach certain goals as stated in the task? Many of the empirical studies in the French technology education research efforts deal with this question, as can be seen in the various chapters of this book. There are different types of tasks and for each type of tasks a suitable type of activity needs to be used. This even applies one level 'deeper': for each specific task within a type of tasks a suitable activity needs to be executed. The relation between task and activity is influenced by context factors in the school and by personal factors in the learner. Therefore a careful analysis of the nature of each of the two poles of the task-activity couple is needed in order to create an educational setting that enables the learners to acquire the desired knowledge, skills and attitudes (Ginestié, 2006) . In this analysis also the barriers that may arise in executing the activities are included. This results in a specific domain of knowledge. So here again, conceptual analysis (now of tasks and activities rather than of references) features prominently in the French approach. This twofold conceptual analysis (related to philosophy on the one hand and to psychology on the other hand) is perhaps the most characteristic element, as compared to other approaches in the world, in the French tradition.
A TENDENCY TOWARDS HIGH TECH
Another, less prominent, but yet clearly present characteristic in French technology education research is a certain tendency to focus on high tech topics. This is strongly reflected in the chapters of this book. Nearly half of them deal with teaching and learning related to computers and the Internet. This is not a coincidence and in fact it fits well the general image of France as a country that wants to present itself as a highly advanced technological country. It was, for instance, one of the first countries in which the government implemented a system for disseminating information on a nationwide scale (the Minitel system). France seems to have this in common with Israel, and it is striking that we see the same relation between a high tech orientation in technology education and in the way the country presents itself in Israel. The work of ORT, one of the major technology education development groups in Israel for instance, also shows a fairly strong focus on high tech applications. The chapters in the first half of this book show that there is more in French technology education than high tech, but undeniable there is quite a bit of attention for high tech in the French approach. It is therefore, perhaps, not a coincidence that the GESTEPRO group had some cooperation with colleagues from Israel.
FINAL REMARKS
The various chapters in this book show that the French technology education research by the GESTEPRO group can make a valuable contribution to the field of technology education. Such contributions are dearly needed, as technology education is still in a vulnerable position in many countries worldwide, as a recent survey has indicated (De Vries, 2006) . We cannot afford to let language differences block the road to international exchange of insights and experiences, not in the least in educational research. Technology education is an important element in the education of future citizens, given the important position of technology in our contemporary societies. A weak conceptual basis and a lack of support from educational research can do a lot of harm to the position of technology education in the curriculum. Strong conceptualization and research support are not the least reasons for the strong position of science education. The danger that technology is seen as merely the application of science, and consequently that technology need not be a distinct element in the curriculum is always there. It is important that technology education we develop a sound academic basis for our case. Joining efforts internationally is crucial for that. Hopefully this book will contribute to that. The availability of the French research outcomes in the English language can stimulate Anglo-Saxon readers to start communicating with the French researchers. There are still a lot of practical barriers to be overcome then, but at least there is a starting point. The future of technology education is worth pursuing that.
RESEARCH IN TECHNOLOGICAL EDUCATION: FROM REFERENCES TO DEVICES
Problematic elements and the work of the Gestepro team
The development of technological education in France is born out of the instability of disciplines not based on traditional academic areas of expertise. More generally, the question which is asked through this development arises from the status of specialised disciplines in French schooling (Scientific, artistic, physical and sports education). The French academic system is divided or even torn by this question of knowledge that could conceivably be taught to all students, or more specifically, to all students with the same professional training or area of expertise. On the one hand, the reference to academic knowledge is proving to be less and less suited to the realities of modern society. Based on irrefutable and robust epistemologies, such knowledge is first and foremost a contributor to social divides and is unable to satisfy the needs of society. For example, more and more students are moving away from scientific specialisations, and scientific teaching made available to all is not bucking this trend. On the other hand, democratic development is supposedly heightening citizens' knowledge, improving their way of thinking and increasing responsibility with regard to making choices and decisions in modern society. Schools face a double challenge: Coupling access to studies for all, with the demand for equal opportunities in a school system suited to all, with access to knowledge for all students in order to create a fairer society. Indeed, it is this challenge on two fronts which is both the cause and consequence of the divides discussed above. This is how developing technological education for all can contribute to the development of a modern school whose job it will be to educate the children who will make up tomorrow's society. Thus the strong divergence on the status of technological education as an academic discipline aims to heighten our understanding of the contemporary technical world. As with the hesitancy that preceded the definition of this teaching, be it in elementary, middle or high school, the institutional norms pose problems. Such difficulties may be down to materials used, or the activities done in class based on them. The first part of this publication, dedicated to the cultural transmission of artefacts, tools and knowledge, discusses the theme of references in order to understand the transformation process which allows us to define teaching situations. Our understanding of the world of technical objects, their existence, and of the social organisations by and for which these objects exist, could be a logical starting point in organising such teachings. The structuring of scholarly institutions is based on a structuring of an academic knowledge of which we will now examine a few of the traits. Such knowledge is implemented in order to serve a given scholarly organisation or institution: classes corresponding to pupils' age range, in a social, cultural, political or economical context.
In this section, we will examine this question through the concept of technical aids, teachers' conceptions of the term 'technology' itself, taking into account the element of risk -taking in certain practices, the knowledge put in place to serve as a stepping stone, or the roles of tools and techniques in analysing technical drawings. Each of these areas of knowledge organises its practical and social usefulness: defining areas of academic expertise which are bound to be distinctive and differently structured according to organisational particularities and the specific requirements of procedures and references. Points of reference can heighten academic knowledge in defined institutions which bring this expertise to life by creating, developing and evolving it, or from the formal description of professional practices based on integrated knowledge which is put into practice in a formalised way. The alternative between generic knowledge in specific institutions (Some people talk about known information or academic knowledge) and practical knowledge in professional circles which some refer to as expertise, is at the heart of the debate about materials used to form the basis for technological education and teaching, at whatever level. The articles which make up this first section shed more light on the process of elaborating upon this knowledge, which is known in France as 'transposition didactique'.
As Colette Andreucci shows, technical aids or objects can help a children's cognitive development. Starting with a series of questions, her article examines how scientific and technical disciplines contribute to both learning and to psychology of development, which have stayed limited and confined on a theoretical level. This restriction is not an end in itself. By discussing both the theories and practicalities of constructing the concept of space taken up by objects, the author conducts an empirical study showing how artefacts contribute to the technical concept of size or bulk which serves as an obstacle in the application of the physic-mathematical concept of body mass.
Often confused with scientific education, technological education is confined to a teaching of applied sciences, or even the application of sciences. In the second chapter of this work, Adel Bouras and Virginie Albe attempt to identify the point of view of teachers in training centres for advanced technicians in Tunisia with regard to technology, and notably, how their discourse depicts the relationships between sciences, technology and society as well as their perception of social and cultural aspects. For these teachers, technology and applied sciences go hand in hand and are central to progress and consumer development. These professors bear witness to a noticeable dichotomy in the status of the knowledge that they use in their everyday lives and in their teachings.
The process of identifying references to define a way of teaching which takes into account the practices used by professionals forms the basis for the book's third chapter, written by Hélene Cheneval-Armand and Jacques Ginestié. By analysing the practices of two thermal engineers concerned with risk prevention, the technicians have to carefully consider their actions in a context where security remains a compromise between the rules to be applied, and the efficiency of their actions. This analysis highlights a contradiction between these real situations, and school situations in which mastering methodologies and standard procedures implemented by preventative institutions is paramount, allowing us to better understand the process for expanding knowledge which is to be taught, in the very social sphere that expands it.
The transformation of knowledge, from its professional engendering to when it is learnt, as Perrine Laon and Jean-Charles Lebahar show, is based on fundamental knowledge obtained through professional practices and the process of transforming such knowledge is a specific one. To support this point of view, the authors examine conceptual approaches by different groups of subjects: practising architects, first and final year students in two schools of architecture. The analysis of subject matter and 'stepping stones' allows for the characterisation of states of knowledge bearing witness to a conceptualisation process in these different groups and indicators of constant transformation, thus characterising the process of transposition didactique or what we may refer to as progressive teaching.
For Pierre Vérillon, in the final chapter of this first section, technological education cannot claim to target the development of an elevated level of conceptualisation and of the capacity to identify and discuss technological developments constructively and objectively, without relying on students being accustomed to and having knowledge of tools and basic technical qualifications. For this, it is not necessary to teach these techniques in any strict uniform way. Based on an instrumental development theory, the author shows how these qualifications are formed from cognitive resources supported by the use of import and socially recognised tools. This allows him to develop a functional analysis of the technical design and an operational model, underpinned by the required reading qualifications.
The second part examines the process of teaching and learning in scholarly situations such as they develop or could conceivably develop in the classroom, with a teacher, pupils and knowledge. There is real emphasis on the procedure of formalising the knowledge which will form the basis and reference points for technological education, whether that means formalising this know how through institutions, or through studies attempting to describe the professional practices. The emphasis is on the need to take into account what we know about something from a technical point of view. What is the thing used for? Who made it and why? Such questions constitute the first step in studying the 'thing' as a technical object. Such an object is of course different from others used in schools, in other disciplinary contexts and which will establish other objects to be studied, such as artistic and scientific objects (which one could sub-divide into categories corresponding to different scientific fields.) This initial step corresponds to a first category of knowledge allowing the person to construct a relationship with the technical objects which make up his environment and are familiar to him. From an educational standpoint the similarities with other object groups, the other ways of categorising, classifying and organising them are clearly defined. For example, to the biological distinction between what is living and non-living, we can add the distinction between living and artificial resulting from the intentionality of human production.
The limitations surrounding these categorisations and descriptions highlight the need for a complex intellectual thought process in order to manipulate objects of which the status may be ambiguous. For example, how to qualify certain robots equipped with revolutionary and auto-adapting software structures giving them the capacity to make decisions in situations where the range of actions widens on a daily basis, compared to primary biological organisms not blessed with this decision making ability….
Such a distinction doesn't really discredit the experts at the head of their field of expertise, but what about ordinary citizens in their everyday lives? How, for example, does one qualify the processes used by man in transforming the environment? Do a Bonsai, a cherry tomato, a milking cow or genetically modified corn play an exclusive role in the biological order? We can see that it's clearly a question of defining the points of view adopted by the subject to establish its relationship with things. Clearly, this point of view is different depending on the context we place ourselves in to establish this relationship. For example, a bonsai can fulfil varying roles; Decorative object in contemporary western homes, a commercial product of which production and growth are nowadays extremely rare, a product of an industrial organisation for gardening and crop growing…Each of these definitions of the word bonsai, taken from a wide range of possibilities, come from a point of view that allows us to see it as a technical object. As far as technological education is concerned, processes for transforming the environment constitute another fundamental epistemological reference point. It induces a particular stance which allows us to place the relationship between man and his environment in the specific context of his actions on this environment to move, organise, structure, protect, modify or destroy it. A form of technology is neither good nor bad in itself. Intrinsically, it is its usage and the social perception of the impact of its usage which determines its value. In this sense, technology is first and foremost a human science, and the study of this science allows for the development of constructive criticism on behalf of future citizens or professionals with regard to the way in which it is used. This point defines a second level of knowledge in terms of 'knowledge to be acted upon' with regard to the environment. Used in industrial settings, it all has to do with the conception, creation and use of technical objects within social organisations structured for this purpose. Based on both the organisation of man's activities to act upon a certain subject, and on the organisation of social human activity through the social division of work, the technical objects take on different forms. They exist as the main part of the transformation process, the tool that allows these processes to take place by prolonging a person's gesture, or by structuring it as the end product of the procedure. This level of knowledge carries a dual importance in the context of technological education: On the one hand, it underlines the need to know about the existence of technical objects and the social structures by which and for which these objects exist. Its other objective is to make us aware of the possibility of using it as a tool to act upon its environment. The goal of knowledge is to form an understanding of the world of technical objects, and also of environments and academic settings which may favour this approach by the pupils. Informing oneself of the possibility of acting upon the environment lends itself to the use of other tools and settings adapted to this confrontation of knowledge with practices. In this case, it is a matter of placing organisations which will enable each student to differentiate between thought and action, in a scholarly context.
As such, the notion of scholarly tasks appears to be a decisive element in organising situations. The task is the expression of what the teacher asks the student to do. The fruit of the student's labour is gained through learning. This means that the student uses his brain to form knowledge, in order to learn something he didn't know prior to completing a task, but which he will know as a result of having done it. Once again, the idea of knowledge is essential to the notion of interaction between student and teacher.
INTRODUCTION
Édouard Heriot one claimed that "culture is what is remained when all else has been forgotten." Indeed, culture offers more than a mere cultural reference framework. Going further, Jérome Bruner (1990 Bruner ( , 2000 affirms that "culture forms the mind."
What does such a statement mean to technological culture? More simply, what is such statement appropriate to the culture that we will qualify as 'material' with reference to studies on cultural anthropology (de Certeau, 1990; Warnier, 1999) ? In other words, how are the relationships between the human subject and the technical reality linked to an epistemic dimension that is too often ignored? More precisely, how does the basic rapport with usage (rather than conception, study and realization) which a child has every day with a multitude of everyday objects, form the basis for significant or even crucial development? In what way do such acquisitions contribute to the though development, and to the learning of scientific concepts?
It is not from the philosophical view that we will look at these questions here, but from the point of view of empirical and theoretical contributions made by didactic and psychological research. Very few conclusive empirical answers have been provided from this perspective. Consequently, the cognitive effect attributable to the relationship between pupils and technical world remains also largely unknown or misunderstood, and the technology as an educational subject also remains devalued on a socio-cultural level. What is more, this is one such argument from our point of view, to justify the investigations that we have been conducting for many years, (Andreucci, 1991) the aim of which is to shed light upon the question of the influence on a cognitive level (from the point of view of the progression in the development of logic and the forming of scientific concepts) of a child's first encounter with the technical objects that surround it. The objective is to promote the scholarly discipline and facilitate the recognition of 'zones of proximal development' (Vygotsky, 1934) upon which technological initiation in schools could be founded.
As we will attempt to indicate later, this question influences much of our studies of which this article aims to heighten awareness. This first part of this article will nevertheless be dedicated, as it should be, to describe the theoretical framework which underlies our approach to the question of the influence of the technical environment on the development of intelligence.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH INTO DIDACTICS
As we know, research into didactics has introduced a new paradigm into educational studies. It has indeed contributed to strengthen the role played by the specific epistemology to each topic of knowledge in teaching and learning. In France, and notably in mathematics where it was first developed, this new perspective gave rise to several additional theories about how to approach the phenomena of teaching and learning, such as that of "transposition of knowledge" theory (Chevallard, 1985) , the "didactical situations" or theory (Brousseau, 1986) and the "conceptual fields" theory (Vergnaud, 1990) .
The major theoretical concepts of these authors were then propagated into others disciplines. As we have shown in two others recent publications (Andreucci, 2005; Andreucci & Chatoney, 2006) , the majority of these concepts (such as 'contract', 'didactical setting', 'devolution', 'institutionalization phase' etc) are themselves useful tools to analyze the activity between pupils and teachers in lessons of technology in primary schools.
Nevertheless, the comprehensive nature (academic, or erudite or expert) of knowledge in different scholarly disciplines has influenced the preferential approaches favoured by didactical studies in each range of subject areas.
So in mathematics, priority has often been given to didactical engineering in order improve the teaching-learning scenarios and process. However, the stability and character of mathematical knowledge which is not much discussed and spread in society have largely lead to neglect the question of filiations between previous socio-empirical knowledge, and academic knowledge to be acquired at school. Consequently, researchers have not attached great importance to finding out whether the technical or non-technical nature of objects represented in solving mathematical problems could affect the sense attributed to the subject matter by pupils.
In science, on the other hand, didactic research is predominantly concerned with "initial representations", "first conceptions" or "natural or naïve reasoning" of pupils, with regard to scholarly knowledge to be formed: whether in different areas Maurines, 1991; Minstrell, 1992; Joshua & Dupin, 1993; Saltiel, 1978; Viennot, 1996; Wellman & Gelman, 1992) or in biology: (Giordan & Vecchi, 1987; Giordan, 1999) . The majority of the authors concerned have argued in favour of a teaching based upon these initial cognitive constructions: these ones having to be fight down and overcome so that a scientific apprehension of the notions concerned can be achieved. According to the notion of "epistemological obstacle" conceived by Bachelard (1938) , these first constructions have generally been viewed negatively as erroneous beliefs of a pre-scientific mentality. At most, the question was to understand how these initial concepts could be efficient to solve any sorts of of physics (Anderson, 1986; Buty et al. 2004; Feldman, 2002; Gerace et al. 2000;  practical situations in everyday life. On the other hand, apart from a few exceptions, (Tiberghein, 2003 ) the problem of the epistemological legitimacy that others cultures (technological or material) could give to this previous knowledge, has not been really studied.
In technological education, because of the relatively recent creation of the subject in most of the countries, and the priority given to integrating it into the school curriculum along with methods explained to professors for teaching it, it is essentially curricular approaches which have been favoured over the last decade. Thus, although technological knowledge is primarily fitted into "social references practices" of a domestic or professional areas (Martinand, 1989) , the question upon the acquisition of specific knowledge (Ginestié, 2000) and previous acquisitions, seemed secondary for experts in the domain. Consequently, as recent reviews on technological education have shown (Boucharenc, 2006; de Miranda, 2004; Zuga, 2004) , the evolution of the subject area now calls for new research models targeting a heightened awareness of cognitive process used in the transmission and appropriation of knowledge and technical expertise.
Thus, the fundamental question relating to the specific way in which the rapport with technical objects engages the cognition today seems ever more crucial, even if as some authors remark (Cajas, 2000; Lewis 1999 ), this kind of investigation appears to lack a theoretical framework appropriate to study it.
THE CONTRIBUTION OF GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY TO THE QUESTION
In discussing the contribution of cognitive psychology to the study of technical intelligence, Weill-Barais (1995) concluded that no contribution of this kind has been made, stated that: " one an only observe the scarcity of research on how children access to technical objects […] The specificity of technical objects generally goes unrecognised by developmental psychologists although it would warrant a psychogenetic approach. This lack of recognition leads to a situation where no manual or reader is available on the subject" D.A. Norman's review in 1993 establish that the same facts applies for American psychology: 'Cognitive science currently seems to be ignoring the power that culture and artefacts have in increasing human capacity, and this apart from the attention that these questions have received at the beginning of psychological and anthropological research. Cognitive research is dedicated to the mechanisms of the memory, attention, language and thought, but studying them in an isolated person without outside help, and generally in the context of a university laboratory. Research has neglected naturalistic observation, group activities and ordinary situations in which people usually act. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising to notice the lack of attention paid to the role of the (natural or artificial) environment in the study of the human cognition".
More than ten years on, these affirmations remain largely relevant. Apart from what is unknown to us, we are still largely or even totally unaware of the way the predominantly artificial nature of the environment influences thought development. Does this mean that this influence remains minor and insignificant with regard to universal thought concepts which account for time, space, number, causality, etc? Shouldn't one instead consider that this influence remains largely misunderstood, simply because out of habit, psychologists are more interested in the subject than the object?
Indeed, one can observe that the redressing of the balance in favour of objects, which has taken place in sociology since 1990 (Akrich, 1990; Latour, 1995) , in economics (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991) , in philosophy (Levy, 1990) and in history (Dosse, 1995; Jacomy, 1990 ) science and techniques have not had an equivalent in developmental cognitive psychology.
Differential psychology which, for example, is largely pre-occupied with understanding how many individual factors play a part in how people solve problems, is hardly or not at all concerned with why different materials can themselves induce particular and original ways of reasoning in children.
It could be that this influence of the technical environment on cognitive development also remains largely unknown because of the important methodological difficulties that are posed to the objectifying of it. Inter-cultural approaches would probably be most relevant in such an area of study, knowing that as Pécheux (1990) indicates: 'If inside of a same culture, the variations in the environment are probably too minor to have discernible effects, we can hope on the ther hand that more clearly contrasts between environments will serve to show obviously different behaviour'.
This cross-cultural perspective has been the object of a large number of synthesis reviews), notably in the context of the Piaget's theory of intelligence development (Lautrey et Tomé, 1976) . His famous operational tests were duplicated in many comparative studies in Africa and Asia. However, these researches were, for the most part carried out in an attempt to confirm the universal importance of the Piaget' model and empirical results rather than proving the effect of more or less industrialized environments. Moreover, these studies have often revealed contradictory results, which is not really surprising considering that crossing from one culture to another carries with it the inconvenience of many factors of variation. However that may be, it would be wrong to say that psychology has totally neglected this question of the influence on development, of technical aspects of the environment. On the contrary, with the majority of well known psychologists, we find arguments in favour of the scientific value of this question. A quick insight is given below. Vygotsky, for example, in 1926 , published (In Scheuwly & Bronckart, 1985 a critical analysis of the state of crisis which he believed psychology was in. In it he denounces the notions of reductionism and dispersion which opposed the theories in this period and contributed to what he called a huge atomistic panorama of the scattered human mind which occults the social, cultural and historical dimension in the development of psychic functions. Contrasting with innate, naturalist and spontaneous approaches, he chose to study superior psychic functions with the help of a method which he qualified as an instrumental method, in which all sign psychological investigations (cf. Berry et al., 1992 and Jahoda & Krewer, 1997 systems are seen as psychological instruments. In other words, they are sociohistorical and cultural constructions which equip mental activity in the same way that physical activity is supplied with technical tools.
It is clear that Vygotsky (In Scheuwly et Bronckart, 1985) exploits the analogy between these two types of tool (technical and psychological) in order to found the different principles of this method:
"In man's behaviour we are faced with a series of artificial adaptations which aim to control psychic processes. These adaptations can by defined through a technical analogy […] . Psychological instruments are artificial constructs: by nature they are social, not organic or individual; their function is to control one's own process of behaviour or that of others, as the function of the technique is […] . Integrated into the behavioural process, the psychological tool modifies the structure and the development of psychic functions, using its properties to define the structure of the new instrumental act, just as technical tools modifies […] . Artificial actions would not be considered supernatural […] . Similar to natural actions, they can be dismantled and put back together as such at the last moment, as can any machine (or technical instrument). Human behaviour can without doubt be seen from two different perspectives […] . As something that is analogue like any machine […] . The integration of the instrument in the behavioural process transforms the evolution and the specifics aspects of all the psychic processes which make up the instrumental act […] just as the technical instruments restructures all the constitution of the working operations.
However, technical instruments for Vygotsky remain mediators for changes imposed upon physical reality, contrary to language and semiotic tools that are considered as the only motors for intellectual development, in as much as they act on the intra and inter psychic level.
Wallon expresses himself more clearly on the subject, notably in an article published in 1935 entitled Psychology and Technique. The problem of the specificity of the instrument to man comparatively with to animals (1941) , that of the opposition between child and primate (1939), questions raised by industrialization (1942) are also discussed in other publications. The following statements illustrate this point:
That will become the notion of presence of a being for a child in front of the television? Also, what differences will there be between the notions of energy and strength understood by the child using electricity to make his train move, and these understood by the little "brute" for whom everything is translated in terms of muscular efforts ?
What becomes of the ancestral notions of balance and movement, when cinema and photography […] . It seems indisputable that technical innovations makes one perceive in new ways. Divorce or a lack of concordance between our mental habits and our global experience, now that it is connected to different forces than those that dominated ancient man, aren't they suddenly going to shake the foundations upon which our perception of things were for so long based? Can new automatisms do other than spread from muscles and sensitivity on intelligence? (H.W., 1935) Primitive or perfected, banal and specialised, a tool is defined by what it is used for. That is its purpose. It imposes its uses on those who wish to use it. It exists as something durable and independent. For those who know its existence, they must go search it if the need arises. It is a constructed object; one built according to certain techniques in view of others techniques […] . This strong individualisation belongs not to a chimpanzee's tool… A tool is only a tool according to the way it is perceived, and it is only perceived as such when it is actively integrated in the action. (H.W, 1941) However, Wallon's theoretical writings on the influence between artefacts and cognition development have not received empirical confirmations.
In this review, it would also be of interest examine Leontiev's writings, for whom the development of the human psyche (1947) owes its specificity to the fundamentally artificial nature of the environment in which a child is brought into the world, which as he indicates, incorporates much more than a simple adaptation like that which governs the evolution of animals:
"From birth, the child is surrounded by an objective world made by man: These are everyday objects, clothes, simple things, language and concepts […] . The natural phenomena themselves, the child encounters them in the conditions created by man: clothes protect him from the cold, artificial lighting chases shadows away into the night. It can be said that a child begins its psychic development in a human world […] the child doesn't adapt to the world of objects and human phenomena which surround it; rather, he makes it as its own, he appropriates it. It is the same for material things, for objects created by human activity such as working tools. For man, a tool is not simply a pre-defined object with a pre-determinate shape with defined mechanical properties. It appears itself as an object in which procedures of action and working operations are incorporated. Knowledge acquired through the historical development of human skills is not simply given to humans in the objective contexts of the material and spiritual culture which surrounds them. It is merely put there. To obtain results and acquire skills, the child must embrace the world through contact ad communication with others.
The process of acquiring specifically human actions such as using a spoon or a spade happens in exactly the same way. Initially, the object that the child takes in its hands goes into its system of natural movements. It brings the spoon with food on it to its mouth, as if he was using some sort of natural 'non instrumental' object. That means, for example, that the child doesn't see the need to hold the spoon horizontally. Later, due to the adult's subsequent intervention, the child reorganises its hand movements: they become consistent with the natural logic of the usage of the spoon. (A.L. 1947)But, once again, we are forced to acknowledge the absence of concrete facts to support such claims.
A few words should also be said about the manner in which Bruner envisaged this question in the context of numerous empirical contributions between 1970 and 1980. His studies are particularly original because he attempted to unite actions and words (in French "savoir faire" & "savoir dire") in showing how the two go together: "I am inclined to believe that technological development has imposed upon language an ever increasing obligation to represent and preserve knowledge, so that it may be called upon in contexts other than that of its first usage [...] . In manufacturing tools, we have become capable of conserving models […] . An inert model, however, serves little purpose; it is an end to be reached without the teaching of a means. Language does more than that, and it is interesting to see how magic unites practice and imitation in primitive technology […] . In its generic forms, the language becomes more and more a vector of knowledge for humans. It is true to say that man is living more and more in a man-made environment. Immaturity is therefore affected by it […] Our techno-social lifestyle which requires the use of tools and symbols is a proof of species' adaptation […] The characteristic response of specie result of technical innovation and not behavioural changes".
Thus, Bruner believes that the initial resorting to language is probably done to support the action to which is it clearly linked. So, according to him, the explanation for the evolution of language lies in man's need for mutual aid; a need that is crucial in the context of the technico-social way of life specific to humanity.
However, although he wishes to reach an understanding of how human "savoir faire" results in the using of tools by man, Bruner paradoxically studied a noninstrumented activity. He examines sensory-motor progress in the gripping, and thus his findings tell us little about links between technical savoir faire and conceptual thought. What is more, when Bruner tackles the question of technological and professional training, the outlook becomes increasingly pessimist:
"Technological complexity has created something incomprehensible for the uninitiated youngster […] Cut off from work which has become difficult to understand, school becomes his first universe. This poses no problem to those who wish to acquire knowledge for itself, but to others, school provides no help whatsoever […] .
There I see symptoms of the efforts made to adapt to a technical-social order which changes too quickly for us to understand or popularise it. The means for a youngster to integrate a social group, inherited from man's capacity to form a culture, seem to lose their effectiveness when such rapid changes become commonplace […] . We are letting technology undermine individual values. (J.B., 1972) The reader will have noticed that up to now, there is a notable absent in these 'picture gallery', conerning Piaget's findings. The raison for this is because the central motor role which his theory assigns to a child's acting upon objects in developing and the unequalled quantity and credit of empirical facts which serve to illustrate this theory.
THE CENTRAL CONTRIBUTION OF PIAGETIAN'S STUDIES
We already know that Piaget's theory of intelligence development attributes a decisive and constructive role to the child's actions upon objects of the physical reality:
"To know an object is to act upon it and transform it, to understand the mechanisms of this transformation related with the transformation actions themselves. To know is to assimilate the reality to structures of transformation, these are the structures constructed by intelligence, as a direct prolonging of the action. No action is due merely to perceptions, because these are always directed and backed up by modes of action. Knowledge therefore proceeds from action, and any action which is repeated or generalised by using new objects in itself breeds a 'scheme' or a sort of praxical concept. The fundamentally constitutional nature of all knowledge is not therefore a mere association between objects, because such a notion neglects the part played by the subject's activity, the 'assimilation' of objects with subject's schemes. This process prolongs the diverse forms of biological assimilations, of which cognitive assimilation is a specific example of a functional integration process (1959) .
For Piaget, later formal reasoning and logical mental operations, as internalised actions, eventually derive themselves from the coordination of general properties of actions amongst themselves.
Even in its more advanced demonstrations where it is only furthered due to thought instruments, intelligence still consists of executing and coordinating actions, but in an interiorised and reflexive form. These internalised actions, as they are transformation processes, are nothing else than logical or mathematical 'operations', motors of all judgment or reasoning (1975) .
So, we agree with Perrin's views (1991) , when he thinks that: 'More than any other science, it seems appropriate to appeal a constructivist epistemology similar to the Piagetian theory, in order to found a science of techniques'.
However, we cannot entirely agree with Perrin when he considers that Piaget too in that way has contributed to the development of an 'integral interactionism'. Indeed, on the contrary, this aspect needs to be revisited and thoroughly studied, by reason of the generic sense given by Piaget to the concept of object (Ducret, 1984) . Indeed its indistinctive and undifferentiated status has led to the same and unclear treatment of all materials, that means whether things in the physical world, beings in the biological world (animals, flowers) or artefacts as objects of technical reality, according to Dagonet's 1989 distinction between these three concepts.
Moreover, intelligence tests have often used the simplest of tools like basic geometric entities, (such as chips, figures or chopsticks) so that a child's thought patterns can seem totally logical, rather than being affected by socio-cultural factors. What is more, the artefacts nevertheless present in certain tests have often been stripped of their functional and technical properties. For example, we showed about the studies on the conservation of liquids that psychologists neglected to control the size of the containers (Andreuci, 1990; Andreucci & Roux, 1992) and so the variation in their ratio filling up. As we will see, studies on invariance of volume of solids set themselves significant methodological and epistemological problems which justify the counter-experiment that we devised to revisit the question.
THE EXAMPLE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF VOLUME Since Piaget, Inheldher and Szeminska's seminal studies of children's spontaneous geometry (1948) and their acquisition of physical quantities (1941), it is well known that the development of volume, as a physical and geometrical construct, appears very slowly and lately. For example, before 11 or 12 years a child will not admit that a same piece of clay, rolled in a ball will occupy an equal amount of space as when rolled in cylinder. Nor will he (she) predict that, immersed into a glass it will raise the water to the same level.
By contrast, he same child, using logical arguments (identity, reversibility, compensation) which would apply also for this situation, will be quite sure of the invariance of the quantity of matter of that piece of clay (acquired around 8 years) and of its weight (round 10) when it undergoes the same transformations. As others acquisitions logically isomorphs but that are realised at different ages this irregularity in development (named horizontal lag") constitutes a limit to Piagetian structuralism. These anomalies of development have been no more simply explained than by the clear yet unpredictable resistance of certain concepts, such as that of volume.
A lot of experimental duplications of these tests (Lunzer, 1960; Lovell & 1982; Augé & Lehalle, 1986 , Twildle, 2006 have confirmed this late construction of volume. The results of certain research (Elkind, 1961) have even revealed important controversy (Nadel & Schoeppe, 1973; White & Friedman, 1977) in establishing that at an older age (13; 6 years old) the majority (71%) of American middle school children didn't have an abstract idea about the concept of volume. Mathematics didactical studies focusing on volume as a measure and arithmetic quantity of space have evidenced others enduring difficulties in pupil's
showing that, at age 15, most pupils have trouble with the competences linked to the tri-linear aspects of volume quantification However, all these studies, focusing exclusively on a physic of mathematical approach of he conceptualisation of volume, have overlooked a possible source of difficulty -i.e., that the child representations of volume linked to practical everyday interaction with three-dimensional artefacts might lead to conflict with scholarly knowledge. These studies didn't see the epistemological obstacle represented by the concept of "bulk" (in French "encombrement" or amount of space occupied) which is to artefacts what volume is to physical and geometrical objects. Volume defines the amount of space taken up by bodies or by materials, whereas bulk (or overall dimensions or room occupied) refers to space monopolised by concrete objects. Although they are considered as synonyms in everyday language, these two concepts have antagonistic properties.
Indeed, bulk is usually clearly defined (for example in technical guides, supply catalogues etc) in the form of three pairs associating measures of length, height and depth (for example; length 18cm, height 25cm, depth 35cm), which unlike volume, are neither interchangeable (due to the functional position of an artefact) or Ogilvie, 1961; Brained, 1971; Bovet et al., 1975; Wilkening, 1980; conceptualisation of the concept (Vergnaud et al., 1983; Voulgaris et al., 2004) , invariable. Nor can one counter balance them to compensate, or multiply them together.
Indeed, as the experiment detailed later shows, several artefacts possess a bulk or global size that can be reduced. This may be due to an imbalance in their three dimensions (a fishing rod, for example), or their intermittent use (like an umbrella) or for ease of transportation (a folding chair). For us, this explains why volume first of all considered as a portion of space occupied by objects (rather than by matter), is still perceived for a long time as a variable and relative quantity rather than a physical and arithmetical invariant. The awareness of the opposite properties of these concepts would be even longer and more difficult to operate than these rival knowledge not benefiting from the same 'status' on institutional and cultural levels. Now, because of the results of didactical studies, in France, volume is taught during the four years of college or middle school. Bulk, however, is still yet to figure in technology curricula. This is a sign of an inferior amount of epistemological consideration given to the pragmatic concepts.
METHOD
Population
The group studied was made up of a selection of 72 pupils, boys and girls aged from five to thirteen years old who participated in the experiment. They were picked at random in classes with pupils whose birthdays were less than a month from their own. Pupils came from three 'levels' of schooling (see Table 1 ). 
Procedure
The children were confronted with 22 common (standard sized) objects. 1-A camera tripod; 2-A telescopic fishing rod; 3-An old fashioned magnifying glass; 4-Five cubes; 5-A collection of four tennis balls; 6-A box serving as a case for the tennis balls; 7-A pair of fold up travel scissors; 8-A pair of foldable glasses; 9-A collection of fifteen small games dice; 10-A box to put the dice in; 11-A folding deck chair; 12-A hollow handled screwdriver with accessories; 13-A nest of five Russian dolls; 14-An inflatable armband; 15-A cylindrical box serving as a glasses case (diameter: 11,5 cm); 16-A wooden cube; 17-A compressible rubber toy mouse; 18-A pocket torch; 19-A battery to light the torch; 20-A candle; 21-A radio cassette case; 22-A ball of squeezable mousse (diameter: 5,5 cm).
The task was to try to put all the objects (or as many as possible) inside a reduced capacity case (68 cm x 42 cm x 13 cm). At the start of the experiment, the objects, and those with changeable structures were arranged in the form where they take up the most space.
The scenario was the following; 'We want to go on holiday and take all the objects on the table; but we only have this briefcase to put them in. ' We then asked the students about the viability of the task and the best way of going about it: "Do you think it's possible to get all of these things in the case? Why? How do you think we should do it? Why do it that way? Is there a means of knowing if it's possible before trying…? ". We then encourage pupils to fill in the objects : «Go ahead and try to put all these objects inside the case and explain to me what you're doing each time. ' We collect the data from an assistant's video recording of the activity. The experiment coordinator is merely allowed to provide physical help for pupils when the children aren't strong enough to do some actions (unscrew the nuts, take off the valve cap, open the closure hook on the fold up chair) due to muscular weakness, or when they state clearly what the oprations are to be done (We can fold the seat,...) without knowing exactly how to do them technically.
RESULTS
Anticipation
The feasibility of the task causes three kinds of reaction; positive (the child thinks that all the artefacts can go into the case), negative (the child thinks it is impossible to put everything in the case) or mixed. The children were confronted with 22 common (standard sized) objects. 1-A camera tripod; 2-A telescopic fishing rod; 3-An old fashioned magnifying glass; 4-Five cubes; 5-A collection of four tennis balls; 6-A box serving as a case for the tennis balls; 7-A pair of fold up travel scissors; 8-A pair of foldable glasses; 9-A collection of fifteen small games dice; 10-A box to put the dice in; 11-A folding deck chair; 12-A hollow handled screwdriver with accessories; 13-A nest of five Russian dolls; 14-An inflatable armband; 15-A The distribution (Procedure) cylindrical box serving as a glasses case (diameter: 11,5 cm); 16-A wooden cube; 17-A compressible rubber toy mouse; 18-A pocket torch; 19-A battery to light the torch; 20-A candle; 21-A radio cassette case; 22-A ball of squeezable mousse (diameter: 5,5 cm).
RESULTS
Anticipation
The feasibility of the task causes three kinds of reaction; positive (the child thinks that all the artefacts can go into the case), negative (the child thinks it is impossible to put everything in the case) or mixed. Table 2 ) of these anticipated judgements shows that the most common kind of answer was one coming directly from figurative data, and according to which it is not possible to put everything in. Thus, two thirds of the pupils say that it is impossible to get all the objects in the case, using arguments based on three criteria: a) the size of the container ('The case is too small'; 'There isn't enough space in the trunk'; b) the quantity of materials involved ('There are too many things'; 'They won't all go in'); c) the size of some objects ('That one is too big, we won't be able to put it in'; 'That won't go in because it's already too big and it doesn't fold away.') The other two predictions (yes; maybe) were equal (slightly less than one child in five) in the whole group. It is clear however, that this data changes with age. The CE2 class (9 year olds) gives a largely stock response to the question: Up to that point, the answer 'it's impossible' is by far the most common (four out of every five children). It is only from the age of CM1 (10 years old) that more diffident predictions are made (such as "it's difficult to know", or 'we can't say before we've tried", "it's possible, but I'm not sure"...) in quite significant numbers (one in three children), "yes" answers themselves becoming more frequent (just over one in every four children).
Furthermore we notice that up to CE2, positive predictions seem somewhat complacent, without the children can argue them ('because I think we can do it'). Beyond that, bulk variability however becomes the main justification for positive points of view as well as reserved ones, the sense of these judgments seemingly linked to the type of fairly detailed exploration of the objects: -thus, pupils who make a positive prediction focus on the artefacts which would prevent the successful completion of the task if they weren't transformable contrary to what they know or want to check about them. On the contrary, those who hesitate concentrate on the multiple constraints of the task (number of objects to deal with; suitcase dimensions; doubt about the size of some objects after transformation).
Answers to the question "before trying, I want you to tell me how to do it", show that the children in the CE2/CM1 group still have radically different answers. Overall, lots of children aged 9 and under say they don't know how to do it. Also, when the children anticipate what procedure to follow, they all suggest going directly into the putting of the objects into the case. Concentrating only on filling the case and nothing else, they only say where they will start from ('We'll start in one corner and then carry on') -what they will start with ('We'll start with the small things'; 'It's easier to do the small things first'; 'I'm putting the little things in at the beginning, to leave space') -or how to progress ('I'm going to squeeze them in tightly against the others').
From CM1 onwards however, most children think of ways to save space, for example 'Some will go into others', 'You need to fold it'; 'I'm going to put the little things inside the big things, fold the chair, and deflate the buoy'; or 'that fits together, that comes apart'.
Finally from CM2 onwards, the majority of children are capable of describing quite clearly and in its entirety the procedure to be followed, by disassociating its two parts and signalling that bigger things should be given priority in packing the case (contrary to younger children who generally decide to start with the smallest).
Global strategies
With problems of a technical nature, this task provides multiple solutions. Consequently, there is not a single 'expert' procedure which could be described step by step. One can, however, cite several important criteria for the pertinence and effectiveness of the activity. Due to the two stages in the task, we can first of all pick out three types of strategy: -The most basic (S1) consists of taking only one aspect of the problem into account: the one that is made clear by the instructions (the filling of the case); the other aspect (reducing 'bulk') -implicit in itself -thus remaining ignored. -The intermediate level strategy (S2) consists of tackling both problems at the same time thus leading to a succession of 'reduction-tidying' operations.
-The most advanced (S3) deals with putting the two stages of the problem into a hierarchy. It consists of thinking about all possible transformations, before moving on to packing the case. From the point of view of action planning, it is the most effective because it leads, at the end of the first step, to having a clear vision of the actual (and not pre-supposed) constraints of the problem: having made all the possible changes, the child can gauge the space taken up by each object, thus allowing him to organise his packing. S2 doesn't allow for such a clear view of the problem because the discovery of constraints is made gradually, step by step. The noticing of these strategies (Table 3 ) highlights a first kind of evolution. We can also note that S1, although more frequent in kindergarten than elsewhere, does not appear dominant even at this level: half of 5 year old children showing themselves capable of reducing the span of at least one object. In contrast with the precociousness shown by certain children in the completion of this task, it appears that others, although older, 'cope' much less ably because this strategy stays with certain children until the age of eight. Hence, the mastery of this human shows up a strong inter-individual distinction or variable.
If the most 'novice' strategy takes a long time to disappear completely, S3, which is the most efficient, takes its time in coming to the fore. Indeed, it doesn't appear before the age of eleven. Furthermore it is rare that it is anything other than a vague sketchiness of a strategy (several reductions made before packing) before this age. From CM2 onwards however, we observe that half the pupils put it into practice.
The intermediate strategy (S2) dominates over a long period of time (from 7 to 11 years old) whilst already being noticeable in some younger children (5 6 year olds) and still sometimes present in the oldest children (12-13 year olds). This gives an incentive to look more closely at what happens on the processes level. It is clear that this mixed strategy can just as easily characterise actions taken which tend (as with S1) to considerably simplify the task by leaving out objects with the biggest volume, as those actions which lead to an almost total success after all the reductions have been made (as with S3),but using most of the time, step by step, to re-organise several important things (the need to take out most of the objects already packed, to account for an object which remains bulky even after it has been altered).
Packing procedures
Taking into account the diversity of the tasks to be coordinated (reduction, placement, closing the case), the number of objects to be dealt with, the variety of changes that can be made to them (fitting together, folding, retraction, etc.), and numerous regulations intervening in the course of the action, it is impossible to describe the processes from the point of view of their dynamic. It is 'merely' a question of seeing how the lead up to the task integrate (or not) the main difficulties of it. That these constraints are progressively taken into account is clearly shown in the data (Table 4) indicating the proportion of children of different ages who fulfil each of the criteria in order to succeed. [achieved by more than one in two children (+); less than one in two children (-); around 1 in 2 children (+-)]
Here, we see that the most common procedure for 5 year olds shows their incapability to overcome all of the constraints of the problem; no clear anticipation; absence of fitting together and reduction; lack of attention paid to voluminous objects, hollow objects left empty; high objects not laid flat; empty spaces left between objects; no calculation of placing and positioning; no checking to see if the case closes, packing deemed complete as soon as the bottom of the case is covered.
Comparatively, the dominant procedure between 6 and 8 year olds reveals different things: around half the children save some space (mainly the fitting together of objects), flatten down objects which would otherwise be too high, squeeze objects together, try putting things in different places, check that the case shuts, only reach the conclusion that fitting everything in will be impossible when the bulkiest objects come into play.
Between nine and ten years old, it becomes clear that the findings described in the previous stage tend to become more generalized, as others arise. Thus, around half the children of that age are clear on what technique they will use ('we'll fit it together, we'll fold it, and then we'll see'), compact bigger objects, think of using smaller things to fill hollow objects; conclude that it would be possible to fit everything in the case with better planning, the other problems created by the task having been overcome by the majority of children.
From the age of eleven, we see that the majority of children are aware of all the factors (position, assembly, filling, compression) allowing for the reduction of occupied space (whether by one or several objects).
But in addition we notice one final significant change. At this age, half the children are conscious that for the task to be completed successfully, priority must be given to the compaction and fitting in of the bulkiest objects, before going back to the priority of resolving the major problems posed by the task. Table 5 provides some extra information. Already by the age of five, we can observe actions taken to reduce bulkiness. They are still of limited number and apply to the least complex objects (building blocks, dice put into a little box or a hollow object, Russian dolls placed one inside the other), which often remain in small parts or quantities (a few cubes, a few dice).
Operations done with a in order to reduce bulkiness
That said, it is not without reason that even in nursery school a child can contemplate deflating the armband. There is no doubt that this is all down to a social and cultural acquisition which goes directly back to the practical uses of an object that the young child is even more familiar with when he is allowed to use it (and when it is an object widely used in the Aix-Marseille region where the study was done).
Verbalization
What we notice about this subject is beyond any doubt: children don't know how to justify the knowledge of their actions with elaborate words. The words 'bulkiness' or 'bulky' are absent from their vocabulary, et the adjectives 'big' or 'small' are systematically substituted with the adjective 'voluminous'.
The youngest children find great difficulty in justify the fitting together or compacting of objects in any way other than sometimes simply saying 'it's just to get it all in'. It is therefore very difficult to know whether these actions are not essentially motivated in the beginning by the idea that 'putting things away' or filling in (in French "ranger") also carries with it a social meaning, the idea of putting things in order by grouping together objects of the same family or type. On the other hand, we can't really see what else this same commentary could mean, apart from «because the object takes up less space' when a transformation applies to an object of which there is only one, in an attempt to make it more compact. This is the argument used by almost all children as soon as they are capable of explaining more clearly what they are doing. Practically all justifications offered are calculations made in terms of the 'amount of space taken up' by objects or 'space created' when they are folded, collapsed or put inside one another, including cracks or spaces between them or when they are packed in tightly to limit empty spaces between them. Therefore it is clear that for children, this expression applies to the variability and relativity of bulkiness. It is equally obvious that from the age of CM2, school teaches children a new word, 'volume', to define the quantity of space occupied by specific objects known as 'solids' (parallel-piped first of all, then cylinder, ball, and pyramid) in mathematics. It is from this moment onwards that certain pupils tend to lean towards this new argument by saying that objects 'take, occupy or hold less volume' after they have been transformed. We have thus been able to explain elsewhere (Andreucci & Roux, 1987 ) some of the difficulties to which the arithmetisation of volume is exposed at a later date (from 12 to 15 years old).
CONCLUSION
The qualitative study of procedures used in attempting to put as many technical objects as possible into a suitcase, confirms beyond any doubt our hypothesis about early understanding of the unstable nature of the bulk of various artefacts. All the children of eight years old discovered the instability of this property. They know from experience that objects can be foldable, have batteries put inside them, put inside each other, telescopic, taken apart or deflated. They are also perfectly aware that the point of these transformations is to reduce the bulkiness of objects, even without knowing what the concept upon which they operate is called. The reversibility of these actions, in that they don't 'affect' the working order of the artefacts, doesn't seem in any doubt for them either. Indeed, in the opposite scenario, the children would not take the initiative to take the objects apart, without asking the experiment coordinator. It is undeniable that there is thus a considerable difference between what the children know how to do faced with this practical everyday task and what they say in realizing the effectiveness of the techniques they use. In reference to the didactic/academic theory of conceptual fields (Vergnaud, 1990) , we can say that the concept of bulkiness is mastered first of all in 'acts' or on a practical level, then on a linguistic level. The pupils don't know how to name this technical concept and have to resort to talking about it in everyday terms space or "room taken up' or 'occupied space.' In reference to the anthropological theory of didactics, we can also say that technology (or a considered explanation of practices) is here way behind technique (or simply the effective way of doing things). Therefore we see how the psycho-genesis of intelligence incorporated in technical objects deserves attention from psychologists, in that it seems able to explain all on its own how some scientific concepts are more resistant than others to purely logical ways of thinking. We also see clearly how these same investigations merit the attention of researchers in technology education, in that they show how the properties of technical artefact are not 'reducible' to those of things, bodies or beings which are studied in other scholarly disciplines.
